Book Review: The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth. by William R. Casto. by Presser, Stephen B.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1996
Book Review: The Supreme Court in the Early
Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and
Oliver Ellsworth. by William R. Casto.
Stephen B. Presser
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Presser, Stephen B., "Book Review: The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth.
by William R. Casto." (1996). Constitutional Commentary. 1021.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1021
Book Review 
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: 
THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLI-
VER ELLSWORTH. By William R. Casto.t Columbia, 
S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995. Pp. xvi, 267. 
Cloth, $49.95. 
Stephen B. Presserz 
Let's be blunt. These have not been happy times for us legal 
romantics. What, you may well ask, is a "legal romantic?" A 
legal romantic, to be distinguished from a "legal nihilist,"3 is 
someone who believes that there actually is some content to the 
rule of law and who believes that it is the task of judges, juries, 
legislatures, and executives to find that content, not making 
things up as they go along, but trying to implement received ide-
als of justice which are more than the sum of individual desires, 
and which partake of divinity itself. Since secularism and indi-
vidual self-gratification are the twin dominant goals of currently 
fashionable legal analysis on and off the bench, we legal roman-
tics often feel isolated, if not abused and depressed. Our fellows 
in the academy regard us with bemused tolerance at best and 
naked hostility at worst.4 
As we legal romantics swoon and watch current events un-
fold-the latest atrocity being the Los Angeles jury's acquittal of 
O.J. Simpson-we wonder what it would be like to live in a soci-
ety that took law seriously, which regarded it as a set of eternal 
1. Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. 
2. Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University. 
3. See generally the exchange between Dean Paul Carrington and Robert Gordon, 
reprinted in Stephen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldin, Law and Jurisprudence in United 
States History 992-1017 (West, 2d ed. 1989). 
4. This does not mean that we can't fight back. See generally Stephen B. Presser, 
Recapturing the Constitution: Race Religion and Abortion Reconsidered (Regnery, 1994). 
Ct. Kenneth Baker, ed., I Have No Gun But I Can Spit: An Anthology of Satirical and 
Abusive Verse (Eyre Methuen, 1980). 
213 
214 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:213 
rules to live by, and in which the practice of law was regarded as 
a higher calling, much like the ministry once was. 
Professor William Casto, best known as the author of several 
excellent but highly specialized works on late eighteenth century 
legal topics, in his new book (building upon and synthesizing his 
earlier work), has given us a look at such a society-that of our 
founding generation. This is a study of the Justices and their ju-
risprudence before John Marshall-that of the Jay and Ellsworth 
courts-during the period before Thomas Jefferson took office, 
and when the Federalist party (the Anglophiliac conservatives 
who served in the Washington and Adams administrations and 
shared the views of Washington's brilliant and accomplished sec-
retary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton) dominated not only 
the executive and the judiciary, but also the Congress. This was 
the era of the two rebellions in Pennsylvania, of the Jay treaty, of 
the X,Y,Z affair, and of the undeclared war with France, and the 
era when our national political schizophrenia began to manifest 
itself. Spurred on by the world's first largely unshackled periodi-
cal press, Americans in the late eighteenth century began to di-
vide profoundly along regional, class, and economic lines, as the 
emerging Jeffersonian party (which preferred France to England, 
localism to cosmopolitanism, and agrarian pursuits to high fi-
nance) campaigned to wrest control of the legislative and execu-
tive branches from the Federalists. Eventually the Jeffersonians 
succeeded, of course, although the Federalist ideals were reborn, 
first with the Whigs, and then with our own era's Republicans, 
continuing the pattern of never-ending political sectarian strife 
which characterizes our history. 
But before Jefferson's victory in 1800, an interesting juris-
prudential experiment conducted by the Federalists took place, 
as the Justices under Jay and Ellsworth sought to implement the 
court system which they believed to have been ordained by the 
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 (both documents, by 
the way, clearly reflecting the efforts of some of the first Supreme 
Court Justices, most notably Wilson, Paterson, and Ellsworth, as 
Casto demonstrates). To the victors belong the spoils of writing 
history, and history departments have been dominated since time 
out of mind by Jeffersonians. Not surprisingly, then, just about 
all that most of us have heard about the pre-Marshall Justices has 
not been particularly good. If they are remembered at all, it is 
for their being sub-standard or worse. Most of us have heard 
about Samuel Chase's peccadilloes, which resulted in his im-
peachment (though not conviction) by the Jeffersonians once 
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they came to power.s We might even have heard about the al-
leged insanity of the man nominated to be the Second Chief Jus-
tice, John Rutledge, or even about James Wilson's ignominious 
end in bankruptcy and despair. Casto tells these stories well, 
stripping away much of the Jeffersonian gloss that has accumu-
lated over the last two centuries. (It must be admitted, however, 
that Casto is not as understanding of Chase as I would have 
liked, but we'll let that pass.)6 
More importantly, Casto, by systematically exploring partic-
ular subject matter areas, such as the origins and formation of the 
Constitution's Article Three and the Judiciary Act of 1789, prop-
erty and contract rights, national security law, federalism, and 
constitutional interpretation, shows us how much Marshall and 
his successors simply borrowed from or built upon an already 
highly-developed collection of rules and principles of national ju-
risprudence. Casto throughly explodes the myth of pre-Marshall 
incompetent nonentities. Moreover, Casto implicitly suggests 
that the accomplishments of our first Justices were made possible 
because these men shared a natural law view of jurisprudence, 
instead of the positivism that dominates our era. In short, our 
earliest judges were legal romantics. This is not a point that 
dominates Casto's analysis, and, indeed, his clear suggestion that 
the Justices he studies were also keenly astute pragmatic judicial 
politicians appears somewhat to run counter to the suggestion 
that they were profoundly influenced by natural law, but this in-
consistency is certainly something that can be left to be worked 
out at a later day. What Casto has given us is the best compre-
hensive guide to the work of the early Supreme Court, and an 
entertaining and witty introduction to the personalities and views 
of the earliest Justices. 
Returning to review the work of our earliest Justices-
Casta's project-is also the project of several other notable 
scholars of legal and constitutional history, including, among 
others, Maeva Marcus (and her crew who are now producing the 
multi-volume Documentary History of the earliest Justices), 
Wythe Holt, Herbert Johnson, George Haskins, and Kathryn 
Preyer, all of whom have clearly influenced and been of great use 
to Casto. They have helped Casto produce a work of legal his-
tory at its best-thoroughly grounded in the primary sources, 
5. For the details, see my The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Ameri-
cans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press, 1991). 
6. See id. at 8 ("[l]t is difficult not to conclude that Samuel Chase was the most 
brilliant of the first justices."). 
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aided in interpretation by discriminating use of secondary 
sources, and appropriately acerbically critical of the conclusions 
reached by others, particularly some law professors (here to re-
main nameless to protect the guilty) who have only dimly per-
ceived the outlines of what constitutional thought was actually 
like in the early years of the Republic. Many of these non-histor-
ically trained scholars have tried to rummage indiscriminately in 
our past for data to support their expansionist notions of what 
the Supreme Court ought to do today, and, in particular, to legiti-
mize the Fourteenth Amendment decisions of the Warren and 
Burger courts. A close study of Casto's work, which is now re-
quired of any legal scholar seeking to understand developments 
on the earliest Supreme Court, shows the dubious nature of this 
scholarly scavenger hunt. 
Even so, as recent events both in Europe and America have 
begun to suggest to the most astute historians among us (one 
thinks here particularly of Eugene Genovese?), there is a need to 
fashion new political and legal approaches which understand the 
real nature of human needs, and seek to construct a republican 
or communitarian ethos to replace the increasingly unsatisfactory 
liberal paradigm of a jurisprudence dedicated to self-expression 
and self-actualization. Perhaps a legal romantic revolution, in-
spired by and in the spirit of the nation's founding, is in the pro-
cess of being launched, and Casto's study can offer glimpses of 
our future as well as our past. Given that we are now a people 
simultaneously committed to what may be mutually incompatible 
and temporally unattainable goals (popular sovereignty, Judeo-
Christian morality, economic expansion, individualism, secular-
ism, racial and gender equality, and the rule of law, for starters), 
it is not likely that our deep divisions will end any time soon, nor 
could we really continue to be Americans without our semi-
chuckleheaded confidence that it's our job to achieve the impos-
sible for the first time in the history of the universe. Neverthe-
less, a reminder of the kind that Casto offers, that (to borrow the 
leading legal Romantic, Paul Carrington's, phrase) "law mat-
ters,"s might make us able to see more clearly where real injus-
tice exists, and help us achieve the "judgment and courage" 
(again to borrow from Carrington )9 necessary to eradicate it. 
7. See, in particular, Eugene D. Genovese, The Southern Tradition: The Achieve-
ment and Limitations of an American Conservatism (Harvard U. Press, 1994). 
8. Presser and Zainaldin, Law and Jurisprudence at 1009-12, 1015, 1017 (cited in 
note 3). 
9. Id. at 996-99. 
